On November 10, the White House hosted President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the first Syrian head of state to visit the United States since 1946. The moment capped a year of breathtaking change for U.S.-Syria relations. Before 2025, Al-Sharaa commanded the al-Qaeda successor organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist faction involved in the long and bloody Syrian civil war. Following a surprise military offensive that overthrew the Assad regime in December 2024, Al-Sharaa and his newly formed government made it clear to the world that Syria is eager to work with the United States and its allies on stability, prosperity, and safety for all its citizens.
This historic moment for Syria marks a golden opportunity to meet Syrians’ needs, while promoting U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. Foreign assistance must be utilized as an instrument of U.S. national power to ensure that Syria continues on a path to success; however, the United States has hamstrung itself by dismantling its foreign assistance infrastructure in an attempt to achieve this goal.
A stable Syria is in America’s interest. Policymakers and legislators from both parties are motivated by issues ranging from protecting Christians and ethnic minorities from terrorism to stemming Iranian influence and creating stability along NATO’s borders. Syrian instability has disrupted global energy markets, but peace helps keep oil prices steady. The civil war sent millions of Syrian refugees across borders, creating friction in host countries from Germany to Lebanon. Stability in Syria will stem the flow of refugees and set the conditions for those willing to return home. The chaos of the civil war allowed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to thrive in Syria’s vast ungoverned spaces. Still, meaningful investments in governance and stability will help the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to eradicate the group and its offshoots once and for all. Similarly, the Syrian Civil War allowed Iran to establish a formidable sphere of influence for its policy objectives against the United States, relying on Iran-aligned militia groups to target Americans in the region. Historically, U.S. allies Turkiye and Israel have suffered from these same threats emanating from Syria, but greater stability inside Syria will lead to greater safety for them as well.
The U.S. commitment to Syrian stability has endured through changes in leadership from 2011 to the present day. The United States should be poised to bring all instruments of national power to bear in Syria, and yet it is not. It beggars belief that the United States would reduce its aid at such a momentous opportunity to chart Syria’s future. In the rapid termination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and foreign aid programs in early 2025, the United States ended Syria programs that supported U.S. efforts to defeat ISIS and counter Iranian influence. These programs highlighted economic opportunity as the key to resolving Syria’s long-term problems. While a modicum of lifesaving, short-term humanitarian aid continues at the Department of State, longer-term development assistance is no longer a viable option. These moves undermine the newly formed U.S. position to help Syria chart a path for prosperity and stability.
As the new Syrian president, Al-Sharaa seeks relief from U.S. and global sanctions. Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress are exploring legislation to make this possible. If and when sanctions relief comes, Syrians will be able to rebuild their war-torn communities, strengthen the local Syrian economy, and better facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced populations. Syrians will also seek healthcare and schools for their children, putting them on a path toward education and prosperity rather than extremism and hunger. U.S. foreign assistance would breathe new life into a revitalized Syria and deepen U.S.-Syrian relations in a way unmatched by U.S. adversaries competing for influence.
To meet the demands of this historic moment in U.S.-Syria relations, the United States must work closely with the newly formed Syrian government to prioritize Syrians’ needs and align them with American interests in the region. Second, the United States must reinvigorate its foreign assistance to Syria as an extension of its foreign policy to operationalize these needs effectively. Lastly, the United States must restore the cadre of American civilian expertise that once sustained an impactful foreign aid program, thereby strengthening U.S. foreign policy objectives. Syria’s golden hour is now–will the United States rise to the challenge?
